Commercial
contracts are designed to provide certainty, yet even carefully planned supply
arrangements can be overturned by events nobody expected. Floods, conflict,
government restrictions, cyber attacks and failures of critical infrastructure
may halt production or stop goods reaching customers. Suppliers can face missed
delivery dates, contractual claims and heavy financial losses. At the same
time, customers may see essential services, operational continuity and
long-standing supply commitments placed under sudden and sustained pressure.
The scale
of disruption can be extraordinary. The National Audit Office (NAO) reported
that, by 31 July 2020, the United Kingdom (UK) government had awarded more than
8,600 contracts worth £18 billion in response to the coronavirus disease 2019
(COVID-19) pandemic. That purchasing programme shows how quickly procurement
priorities and supply conditions can change. Widespread disruption, however,
does not by itself decide whether any individual supplier is entitled to
contractual relief.
Under
English contract law, obligations do not ordinarily disappear because
performance becomes inconvenient, expensive or commercially unattractive. Force
majeure protection usually depends on expressly agreed terms, including the
events covered and the effect those events must have on performance. Where no
applicable clause exists, the separate doctrine of frustration may occasionally
discharge a contract, but its threshold is demanding. Ordinary market pressures
and preventable operational problems generally remain commercial risks for
whoever accepted them.
The
distinction between external events and supplier responsibility is therefore
essential. An unexpected government prohibition might stop a particular
shipment altogether, while rising freight charges merely make delivery less
profitable. A major storm could close a manufacturing site, yet poor
maintenance or a failure to investigate available alternatives may seriously
weaken any resulting claim. Contractual wording, evidence of causation, and the
reasonable steps actually taken must all be examined together before reaching
conclusions.
The
central question is not simply whether something extraordinary happened, but
whether that event legally excuses the particular failure to perform. Clear
notice, reliable records and proportionate mitigation often determine how a
claim is assessed and whether protection applies. For procurement and contract
management teams across the public and private sectors, understanding these
distinctions supports fair decisions, business continuity and balanced risk
allocation when established supply arrangements come under serious pressure.
What Is Force Majeure and
How Does It Work?
Force
majeure describes circumstances in which an exceptional event may excuse,
suspend or delay contractual performance under provisions the parties have
agreed. English law has no general statutory doctrine that automatically grants
protection whenever disruption occurs. Instead, the contractual wording
normally determines which events qualify, which obligations are affected and
what relief becomes available. Suppliers therefore cannot assume that an
unforeseen crisis releases them from their commitments, no matter how severe
its wider economic consequences.
A typical
clause identifies events beyond a party’s reasonable control, sets out
notification requirements and explains the consequences of interrupted
performance. Such provisions may allow extensions of time, temporary suspension
or eventual termination after prolonged disruption. However, establishing a
qualifying event is only the first step in the assessment. The affected party
must also show that the event had the effect on its contractual obligations
that the agreement requires, judged against the clause’s precise words.
Consider
an illustrative £5 million supply agreement under which flooding closes the
manufacturer’s only production facility and prevents scheduled deliveries.
Whether additional time, suspension of liability or protection against damages
becomes available depends entirely on the agreed clause, including its
causation and mitigation requirements. Two contracts facing essentially
identical disruption can therefore produce very different financial outcomes,
simply because their force majeure provisions were drafted, negotiated and
priced in different ways.
Where an
agreement contains no force majeure provision, English law does not insert one
merely because circumstances have become exceptional. Obligations ordinarily
remain enforceable unless another contractual term, applicable legislation or
the narrow common-law doctrine of frustration provides relief. Frustration may
discharge future obligations where performance becomes radically different from
what was agreed, but inconvenience, increased expense or reduced profitability
will rarely satisfy that threshold. Careful drafting is consequently the
principal source of protection.
What Events Can Qualify as
Force Majeure?
Qualifying
events depend on the contract, although clauses commonly list floods,
earthquakes, extreme storms, fires and other natural disasters. Storm Babet
illustrates the potential scale: the Environment Agency’s annual flood report
recorded more than 5,000 properties flooded in October 2023, while flood
defences protected approximately 97,000. A flooded warehouse might genuinely
prevent dispatch, whereas a supplier whose operations were unaffected could not
rely on the storm simply because it struck nearby.
Pandemics
and the government restrictions that follow can disrupt production, transport
and the availability of essential materials. During COVID-19, regulations
closed many premises and constrained workforces for extended periods. Yet the
courts consistently examined the contract rather than the pandemic itself,
asking whether the specific obligation was affected in the manner the clause
required. A global emergency establishes context; it does not automatically
confer relief on every supplier whose costs or schedules suffered.
War,
terrorism, civil unrest, sanctions and border closures may qualify where the
agreement covers them, and they obstruct required performance. A sanctions
prohibition might make a specified payment or shipment unlawful, while military
conflict could close an essential transport corridor. Nevertheless, the
affected party must identify the precise obstacle, its contractual consequences
and any lawful alternative. Political uncertainty alone, without the necessary
causal connection to performance, is unlikely to establish an entitlement to
protection.
Industrial
action, cyber attacks and failures of electricity, telecommunications or
transport infrastructure deserve equally careful attention. The government’s
Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2025 found that 43% of UK businesses had
experienced a breach or attack during the preceding twelve months. That
prevalence demonstrates operational exposure, not universal contractual relief:
an incident might disable a distribution centre, while weak security controls
or untested recovery arrangements could considerably undermine the supplier’s
claim.
Clauses
also differ in how they describe qualifying events. Some contain an exhaustive
list, others a general formula such as ‘any cause beyond the reasonable control
of the affected party’, and many combine both. A general formula may capture
events not named individually, while an exhaustive list may exclude serious
disruption the drafters did not anticipate. Express carve-outs, commonly for
lack of funds or price changes, can narrow either approach significantly.
A dramatic
headline therefore never substitutes for the contractual test. An event
expressly listed in the clause may still fail to qualify because it did not
prevent the relevant obligation, was within the supplier’s control or could
reasonably have been overcome. Contract managers should read the full
definition, any exclusions, and the operative wording together before accepting
or rejecting a supplier’s explanation, and should clearly record how they
reached their conclusion.
Beyond Reasonable Control
– Who Bears Responsibility for Disruption?
Reasonable
control separates genuinely external disruption from problems an organisation
should manage through competent operations. An unprecedented flood may be
unavoidable, but machinery breakdown after repeated ignored maintenance
warnings presents a very different picture. Poor forecasting, inadequate
staffing, defective stock control and negligent transport planning do not
become force majeure merely because their consequences are serious. The
question is whether the actual impediment lay beyond the affected party’s
reasonable control at the relevant time.
The fire
at the North Hyde substation in west London on 20 March 2025 illustrates the
point. It cut power to more than 70,000 customers and closed Heathrow Airport
for most of the following day, disrupting over 270,000 passenger journeys. The
National Energy System Operator later found that a high moisture reading in a
transformer component, identified in 2018, had not been addressed, and Ofgem
opened an enforcement investigation into National Grid Electricity
Transmission.
These
technical findings do not themselves establish contractual liability or
determine whether any particular force majeure claim would succeed. That
assessment requires examining the affected party’s contractual obligations,
control over the relevant circumstances, and available means of avoiding or
overcoming the disruption.
For an
airline, retailer or caterer operating at Heathrow, the outage was plainly an
external event. For the owner of the failed asset, however, evidence of a known
and unresolved defect would raise obvious questions about reasonable control.
The same incident can therefore look very different depending on where a party
sits in the chain. Procurement teams should ask who could realistically have
prevented the disruption, and whether the party claiming relief was that
organisation.
Even where
the initiating event is external, the response matters. A business with no
safety stock, relying exclusively on one vulnerable supplier, or neglecting
tested recovery arrangements may struggle to prove the interruption could not
reasonably have been avoided. English law does not impose an identical
contingency standard on every organisation, regardless of scale, cost, or
context, but it will usually examine maintenance records, risk assessments, and
continuity plans closely.
Impossible, Prevented or
Delayed – What Level of Disruption Is Required?
Force
majeure provisions use different expressions to describe the effect required
before relief arises. A clause referring to performance being ‘prevented’
generally sets a more demanding threshold than one covering performance being ‘hindered’
or ‘delayed’. Prevention ordinarily involves inability to perform the relevant
obligation, rather than inconvenience or reduced profitability. Each expression
must nevertheless be interpreted within the entire agreement, including any
specific definitions, exceptions and remedies the parties chose.
Consider a
manufacturer whose specialist production line is destroyed by fire. If the
contract requires goods from that particular facility, delivery may genuinely
be prevented for a substantial period. If equivalent goods could reasonably be
supplied from another approved plant, the outcome may differ entirely. A
temporary road closure, by contrast, might delay delivery without making
eventual performance impossible, particularly where contractual deadlines and
permitted transport alternatives remain reasonably flexible.
Partial
performance creates further complications. A supplier able to deliver 70% of an
order cannot necessarily suspend all its obligations because the remaining 30%
is affected. Some clauses excuse performance only ‘to the extent’ of the
disruption, while others provide mechanisms for allocation, extension, or
termination. An illustrative £2 million contract could therefore generate
materially different liabilities depending on whether the clause protects
affected deliveries individually or permits a broader suspension of
performance.
In
Seadrill Ghana Operations Ltd v Tullow Ghana Ltd [2018] EWHC 1640 (Comm), a
government drilling moratorium was among the events listed in a rig hire
contract. Yet the court rejected Tullow’s reliance on force majeure because
another effective cause of non-performance fell outside the clause and Tullow
had failed to satisfy its contractual reasonable endeavours obligations.
Identifying a qualifying event was insufficient without examining how the
specific obligation became impossible to perform.
The
practical distinction lies between an event that affects operations and one
that satisfies the contract’s chosen threshold. Transport congestion may slow
delivery without preventing it, whereas an export prohibition may preclude a
particular shipment altogether. Procurement managers should compare the agreed
specification, destination, completion date and permissible alternatives
against what the supplier can still achieve. Relief should reflect the actual
interruption established by evidence, rather than an unsupported declaration of
impossibility.
Foreseeability – When an
Exceptional Event Was Already a Known Risk
Foreseeability
matters in force majeure disputes, but English law imposes no universal rule
that every qualifying event must be unforeseeable. A contract may expressly
require unexpected circumstances, exclude known risks or say nothing at all.
Timing is also significant: a supplier contracting after sanctions have been
announced cannot readily treat those existing restrictions as a new impediment,
although a later and materially different restriction might create an obstacle
the parties never contemplated.
Extreme
weather shows why simple conclusions are dangerous. The Met Office recorded
twelve named storms during the 2023–2024 season, the highest number since storm
naming began in 2015. That history makes seasonal disruption a recognisable
planning consideration, but does not mean a particular severe flood was within
an individual supplier’s reasonable control. Contract wording and the practical
opportunities for precaution remain decisive when entitlement is assessed
against the agreed clause.
Pricing is
closely connected with foreseeable risk. If a supplier agrees a fixed price
despite known energy volatility or constrained material availability, later
increases normally remain its responsibility unless the contract provides
otherwise. An illustrative £10 million agreement may become considerably less
profitable without becoming legally impossible. Buyers and suppliers should
therefore distinguish price-adjustment provisions, hardship arrangements and
force majeure clauses when negotiating how exposure to changing conditions will
be shared.
Proving Force Majeure –
Causation and the Burden of Evidence
A party
invoking force majeure ordinarily bears the burden of proving the facts needed
to obtain relief. Evidence must show more than the existence of a storm, cyber
attack or government restriction; it must connect that event to the obligation
said to be affected. Relevant records include production reports, delivery
schedules, access restrictions, transport cancellations, correspondence and
contemporaneous decisions explaining why agreed performance could not continue
in the manner the contract required.
Chronology
often determines a claim’s strength. Procurement teams should establish when
the event began, when the supplier became aware of its consequences and whether
performance had already fallen behind. A missed delivery predating the alleged
disruption may reveal an independent default. Similarly, a supplier whose
output had been falling for months cannot necessarily attribute the entire
shortfall to a later exceptional event without identifying the additional
consequences that event actually caused.
Concurrent
causes can make the analysis especially difficult. In Seadrill, Tullow
terminated its contract for the West Leo drilling rig in December 2016, relying
on a moratorium affecting a disputed maritime area. The court found that the
Ghanaian government’s refusal to approve drilling in another field, which was
not a force majeure event, was also an effective cause. Seadrill obtained
judgment for more than 250 million United States (US) dollars.
Mr Justice
Teare emphasised that whether a force majeure event must be the sole effective
cause is ultimately a question of construction of the particular clause, so
Seadrill does not establish a universal rule. In Classic Maritime Inc v
Limbungan Makmur Sdn Bhd [2019] EWCA Civ 1102, the Court of Appeal similarly
held that the wording of that clause required the charterer to show it would
have performed but for the qualifying event.
The event
in Classic Maritime was the collapse of the Fundão dam in Brazil on 5 November
2015, which halted iron ore pellet production at the Samarco mine. Because a
slump in steel demand meant the charterer would not have shipped the cargoes
anyway, it could not rely on the clause. The Court of Appeal awarded the
shipowner substantial damages of approximately US$19.87 million, overturning an
earlier award of nominal damages.
Evidence
should also address reasonable alternatives. If a transport route closed, were
other carriers available? If machinery stopped, could approved subcontractors
or alternative sites meet the specification? A supplier might document an
illustrative £250,000 of additional freight costs, but such figures quantify
disruption rather than prove entitlement. Quotations, contingency assessments
and correspondence with alternative providers become particularly important
where the customer challenges whether reasonable endeavours were genuinely
used.
Notification Requirements
– When Failure to Give Notice Removes Protection
Force
majeure clauses often require prompt written notification once an event occurs
or its effect on performance becomes apparent. The notice may need to identify
the event, the affected obligations, the expected duration, proposed mitigation
and supporting documentation. Some agreements prescribe particular email
addresses, named recipients or delivery methods. These details should be
followed carefully, because informal telephone discussions may not satisfy an
expressly required contractual notice procedure, however genuine the
disruption.
The
consequences of late notification depend on the wording. Where timely notice is
clearly expressed as a condition precedent to relief, non-compliance may defeat
the claim even though genuine disruption occurred. Other clauses impose a
notification obligation without making punctual notice an absolute
prerequisite, so that late notice may give rise only to a claim in damages. It
is therefore inaccurate to suggest that every delayed notice automatically
removes force majeure protection.
Continuing
communication matters as much commercially as the initial notice. A supplier
should provide revised delivery forecasts, explain alternative sourcing
enquiries and report when production or transport resumes, particularly where
the contract requires periodic updates. For a public authority dependent on
medical supplies or emergency repairs, early warning allows continuity
arrangements to start. Withholding information until deadlines have passed can
intensify operational losses and provoke avoidable disputes over
responsibility.
A reliable
evidence trail should include dated notices, proof of receipt, internal
escalation records, photographs, relevant official orders and written
assessments of alternative performance. Contract managers should acknowledge
receipt promptly without prematurely accepting that a qualifying event has
occurred, and should equally avoid automatic rejection before examining the
clause and the circumstances. Clear documentation, proportionate enquiries and
timely decisions reduce uncertainty while preserving both parties’ contractual
rights during prolonged disruption.
Mitigation and Reasonable
Endeavours – What Must Suppliers Do?
A supplier
facing force majeure must consider whether reasonable measures can prevent,
reduce or overcome the disruption, particularly where the contract imposes that
obligation expressly. Mitigation may involve alternative manufacturers,
substitute transport routes, revised production schedules or temporary changes
to working arrangements. The nature and extent of a reasonable endeavours
obligation depend on its wording and the circumstances, including the
expenditure reasonably required, the resources available and the parties'
respective interests where relevant to the contractual obligation.
Alternative
sourcing is frequently the first practical consideration. A manufacturer
dependent on one component supplier might investigate approved distributors,
alternative materials or additional production capacity. Replacement goods must
still satisfy contractual specifications, safety standards and regulatory
requirements. A cheaper or immediately available substitute is not necessarily
acceptable where the customer has contracted for particular materials,
technical characteristics or manufacturing processes that cannot lawfully or
contractually be changed without its agreement.
Proportionality
also shapes the assessment. Using illustrative figures, a supplier facing a
£50,000 delivery obligation might reasonably pay £5,000 for additional freight,
whereas an alternative costing £200,000 raises materially different questions.
Reasonable endeavours do not invariably require unlimited expenditure,
acceptance of substantial losses or abandonment of contractual rights. In
Seadrill, however, the court considered that Tullow should have used the idle
rig on available work, even though that work was less profitable.
The
Supreme Court clarified an important limitation in RTI Ltd v MUR Shipping BV
[2024] UKSC 18. MUR had agreed to carry monthly bauxite cargoes from Guinea to
Ukraine, with freight payable in US dollars. After US sanctions were imposed on
RTI’s parent company, Rusal, in April 2018, MUR suspended performance. RTI
offered to pay in euros and cover any conversion costs, but MUR declined, and
the Supreme Court ultimately upheld its position unanimously.
The Court
held that reasonable endeavours did not require acceptance of non-contractual
performance without sufficiently clear wording. The judgment reinforces the
difference between overcoming disruption and rewriting the bargain. Suppliers
should pursue practical alternatives that allow performance as contracted,
while customers should recognise that such obligations do not automatically
authorise different payment arrangements, specifications or delivery terms.
Where change is commercially desirable, a properly documented variation remains
the safer route.
Rising Costs and Supply
Shortages – When Commercial Hardship Is Not Enough
Commercial
hardship is among the most misunderstood aspects of force majeure. Inflation,
energy price spikes, currency movements and material shortages may sharply
reduce profitability without excusing performance. According to revised Office
for National Statistics data, UK producer input prices rose by 24.1% in the
year to June 2022. Such pressure is exceptional, yet increased expenditure does
not by itself establish impossibility or satisfy a typical force majeure
provision.
Construction
offers a particularly vivid example. The government’s monthly building
materials statistics recorded a 23.5% annual increase in the ‘All Work’
material price index in August 2021, with imported plywood up 78.4% and
fabricated structural steel up 74.8%. Over the year to December 2021, repair
and maintenance materials rose by 23.2%, a direct concern for housing
associations and local authorities managing fixed-price responsive repairs and
planned maintenance contracts.
The courts
have long resisted treating such increases as force majeure. In Thames Valley
Power Ltd v Total Gas & Power Ltd [2005] EWHC 2208 (Comm), Total argued
that soaring gas prices made continued supply under a long-term agreement
uneconomic. The Commercial Court rejected that argument, holding that
performance becoming dramatically more expensive is not a ground for relief.
Fixed-price suppliers ordinarily carry the risk of adverse market movements
unless the contract shifts it.
The 2021
carbon dioxide shortage shows how such pressures are usually resolved
commercially instead. CF Fertilisers halted production at its Ince and
Billingham plants in September 2021 because high natural gas costs had made
operations unprofitable, interrupting a major source of food-grade carbon
dioxide. The government provided limited support for three weeks while
customers negotiated new supply contracts, illustrating renegotiation rather
than contractual excuse as the practical answer to hardship.
The
pandemic produced similar lessons in public procurement. The NAO reported that
exceptional market conditions increased the cost of purchasing personal
protective equipment (PPE) by approximately £10 billion when compared with 2019
prices. The Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) faced intense
international competition, limited availability and rapidly rising prices. That
estimate reflects higher purchase prices, not a judicially established loss,
and does not show any supplier was legally unable to perform.
Hardship
provisions, indexation arrangements and price-adjustment clauses offer more
appropriate mechanisms for managing cost pressures. They may permit
renegotiation, revised charges or termination when specified economic
thresholds are exceeded. Their operation differs fundamentally from force
majeure, which normally addresses impediments to performance rather than
declining profitability. An illustrative £2 million equipment contract facing
an extra £400,000 in materials, energy and freight costs would usually depend
on such mechanisms, not force majeure.
Cyber Attacks and
Infrastructure Failure – Modern Disruption Under Established Principles
Cyber
incidents now rank among the most serious causes of supply interruption in the
UK. Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) halted production at its UK plants from 1 September
2025 for around five weeks after a cyber attack. The Cyber Monitoring Centre
(CMC) estimated the UK financial impact at £1.9 billion, within a range of £1.6
billion to £2.1 billion, describing it as the most economically damaging cyber
event yet to hit the country.
The
consequences cascaded through the supply chain. The CMC estimated that more
than 5,000 UK organisations were affected, many of them suppliers and dealers
dependent on JLR’s production. On 28 September 2025, the government announced a
UK Export Finance guarantee for a commercial loan to JLR, expected to unlock up
to £1.5 billion and repayable over five years, to help it support those
suppliers. For many lower-tier suppliers, the initial disruption originated
outside their own operations. Whether that disruption entitled them to
contractual relief would nevertheless depend on their individual agreements,
the consequences for performance and the reasonable alternatives available.
Retail
suffered similarly. Marks and Spencer (M&S) suspended online clothing
orders for around seven weeks after a cyber attack in April 2025. M&S
initially estimated a £300 million hit to operating profit before mitigation,
later reporting £324 million in lost sales and receiving £100 million in
insurance proceeds. The episode shows that insurance and business continuity planning,
rather than force majeure, often determine how much of the loss is ultimately
recovered.
Public
services are equally exposed. A ransomware attack on Synnovis, the pathology
partnership serving King’s College Hospital and Guy’s and St Thomas’ National
Health Service (NHS) Foundation Trusts, began on 3 June 2024. NHS London later
reported 10,152 acute outpatient appointments and 1,710 elective procedures
postponed at the two trusts, and Synnovis estimated its own direct losses at
£32.7 million, showing how one provider’s incident can disrupt essential public
services.
Whether a
cyber attack qualifies as force majeure depends on the clause and the evidence.
Some contracts list cyber incidents expressly; others exclude events
attributable to inadequate security, unpatched systems or failures to follow
recognised standards. A supplier hit by a sophisticated attack despite robust
controls stands in a very different position from one that ignored warnings.
Contract managers should therefore request evidence of security controls,
recovery testing and incident response before accepting such claims.
Subcontractors and Supply
Chain Failure – Can Disruption Be Passed Down the Chain?
Complex
supply chains create difficulty when disruption originates beyond the
organisation holding the principal contract. A supplier may depend on
specialist manufacturers, logistics providers, technology partners or overseas
material producers. Difficulties those organisations experience do not
automatically release the principal supplier from its obligations. The decisive
questions concern the agreed allocation of risk, the definition of force
majeure and whether the subcontractor’s failure actually prevented performance
of the principal contract.
Back-to-back
provisions can reduce uncertainty by aligning obligations between customers,
principal suppliers and subcontractors, covering delivery deadlines,
notification, liability limits and qualifying events. However, identical
wording is not always achievable or sufficient. A principal supplier might
remain liable to its customer even after receiving relief from its own
subcontractor, particularly where the customer-facing agreement offers narrower
protection or demands more extensive mitigation. Gaps between the two contracts
are where unrecoverable losses typically accumulate.
The DHSC’s
pandemic experience demonstrates the exposure created by international supply
dependence. The NAO reported that, by January 2022, PPE contractual commitments
totalled approximately £13.1 billion, including £2.5 billion paid to suppliers
before delivery. Exceptional global demand exposed purchasing organisations to
delivery risk and substantial advance commitments, showing why advance payment
terms, quality inspection and supplier financial strength deserve close
scrutiny before public money changes hands.
Supplier
due diligence should therefore extend beyond the immediate contracting
organisation. Procurement teams should examine critical subcontractors,
manufacturing locations, alternative sources, stockholding arrangements and
single points of failure, including shared technology platforms. Requiring
early notification of subcontractor disruption can provide valuable time to
protect essential services. Effective resilience depends on identifying
vulnerabilities before disruption occurs, rather than assuming responsibility
can be transferred whenever another organisation in the chain encounters
difficulty.
Suspension, Extensions and
Termination – The Contractual Consequences
A valid
force majeure claim may suspend certain obligations, extend delivery deadlines
or excuse liability for specified failures, depending on the contract. Such
protection does not necessarily release every obligation or end the agreement.
A supplier prevented from delivering goods for fourteen days might receive a
corresponding extension while remaining responsible for unaffected services.
The precise consequences depend on the contractual relief mechanism and the
extent of disruption actually established.
Suspension
raises important financial questions. An illustrative £3 million contract might
provide for monthly payments of £250,000, yet a temporary interruption does not
settle whether those payments should continue. Some agreements suspend payment
for undelivered services, while others preserve standing charges or require
payment for completed work. The treatment of deposits, advance payments,
partially delivered goods and unavoidable operating costs should be examined
before any financial adjustment is agreed.
Prolonged
disruption may activate express termination rights. Many contracts permit
termination after thirty, sixty or ninety consecutive days of qualifying force
majeure, although no universal statutory period applies. Termination rights may
belong to either party or depend upon the importance of the affected
obligations. Before serving notice, contract managers should verify the
applicable threshold, how the disruption period is calculated, any procedural
requirements and whether the contract offers an opportunity to restore
performance.
Termination
also raises questions about accrued rights, damages and outstanding
liabilities. Force majeure relief will not necessarily extinguish payment
obligations that arose before the disruption, or excuse breaches unrelated to
the qualifying event. Depending on the agreement, termination may require the
return of equipment, transfer of records, settlement for completed work or
assistance with replacement arrangements. Clear exit provisions help prevent an
operational emergency from becoming a prolonged and expensive commercial
dispute.
Customers
should also consider their own position during suspension. A public body cannot
simply wait while a supplier’s force majeure period runs if residents, patients
or service users depend on continuity. Interim arrangements, such as temporary
substitute suppliers or reprioritised deliveries, should be documented
carefully so that they do not inadvertently waive rights, amount to an
unplanned variation or breach the procurement rules governing additional or
replacement purchasing.
Force Majeure Versus
Frustration – Two Different Legal Protections
Force
majeure and frustration address exceptional disruption through fundamentally
different mechanisms. Force majeure operates through express provisions
allowing the parties to define qualifying events and their consequences.
Frustration is a narrow common-law doctrine that may apply where a supervening
event, without relevant fault, makes contractual performance impossible,
unlawful or radically different from what was originally undertaken, having
regard to the contract and allocation of risk. It requires no expressly drafted
clause.
The
doctrine considers whether the parties have already allocated responsibility
for the relevant risk. Where contractual provisions adequately address an event
and its consequences, frustration generally has little room to operate, and the
House of Lords in Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council
confirmed that unexpected difficulty and additional cost are not enough. Unlike
force majeure, frustration discharges the contract automatically and entirely;
it cannot temporarily suspend obligations while performance is restored.
The
pandemic tested that last point directly. In Bank of New York Mellon
(International) Ltd v Cine-UK Ltd [2022] EWCA Civ 1021, cinema tenants argued
that rent should not be payable while COVID-19 regulations forced closure. The
Court of Appeal rejected every defence, holding that the leases allocated the
risk of being unable to use the premises to the tenants. The High Court had
earlier found no English doctrine of temporary frustration.
A further
example arose in Canary Wharf (BP4) T1 Ltd v European Medicines Agency [2019]
EWHC 335 (Ch). The agency argued that the UK’s withdrawal from the European
Union would frustrate its 25-year lease, which ran to 2039 without a break
clause and carried obligations of around £500 million. The High Court rejected
both its common-purpose and supervening-illegality arguments, and the agency
later settled the dispute by agreeing a sublease.
Self-Induced Frustration –
When the Obstacle Is of a Party’s Own Making
The
doctrine of frustration will not ordinarily assist a party where the alleged
frustrating circumstances arise from its own relevant decisions or conduct.
English courts distinguish genuinely supervening events from circumstances
attributable to contractual choices, preventable failures or voluntarily
assumed risks. Whether frustration arises depends on the entire contractual
context, including the available alternatives and the extent to which
responsibility for the disruption has already been allocated between the
parties.
The
leading illustration is J Lauritzen AS v Wijsmuller BV (The Super Servant Two)
[1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1. Wijsmuller agreed to transport a drilling rig using
either of two specialist vessels. After Super Servant Two sank in January 1981,
Wijsmuller argued frustration, but it had already allocated Super Servant One
to other contracts. The Court of Appeal held that the impossibility resulted
from Wijsmuller’s own election, so the contract was not frustrated.
The
principle has obvious procurement relevance. A supplier that commits limited
capacity to several customers and then cannot serve one of them after a
breakdown may find that its allocation decision, not the breakdown, is treated
as the operative cause. Similar reasoning appears in force majeure clauses
through the reasonable control requirement. Contract managers should therefore
ask what choices the supplier made before and after the event, and why it made
them.
When a Contract Is
Frustrated – Legal and Financial Consequences
When
frustration occurs, the contract is discharged from further performance
automatically, without either party exercising a termination right. That does
not mean every financial consequence disappears. The Law Reform (Frustrated
Contracts) Act 1943 provides statutory mechanisms for adjusting certain rights
under contracts governed by the law of England and Wales. It applies to Crown
contracts as it does to private agreements, while Scotland applies different
rules and Northern Ireland has equivalent legislation.
Section 1
generally allows recovery of sums paid before discharge and provides that sums
then payable cease to be payable. Where the recipient incurred expenses in
performing the contract before frustration, however, the court may allow it to
retain or recover an amount it considers just, up to the sums paid or payable.
An illustrative £100,000 advance payment might therefore be recoverable only in
part if qualifying preparatory expenditure had been incurred.
The Act
also addresses valuable non-monetary benefits received before frustration.
Where one party has obtained such a benefit through the other’s performance,
the court may award a just sum not exceeding the value of that benefit.
Partially completed construction work that remains valuable despite a project’s
cancellation is a typical example. The appropriate adjustment depends on the
benefit actually received, relevant expenditure and the effect of the
frustrating event itself.
The 1943
Act does not apply uniformly. Section 2 gives effect to contractual provisions
intended to govern frustration, allows severable and fully performed parts of a
contract to be treated separately, and excludes most charterparties and
contracts for the carriage of goods by sea, insurance contracts and certain
contracts for specific goods that perish. Practitioners should not assume that
frustration automatically produces a complete refund or a simple division of
losses.
Force Majeure in Public
Sector Contracts – Continuity and Accountability
Force
majeure presents particular challenges for public bodies because disruption can
directly affect essential services, statutory duties and public money.
Hospitals, local authorities, housing providers and government departments may
depend on uninterrupted supplies and specialist contractors. A legally valid
supplier claim does not remove the authority’s responsibility for service
continuity, so contract managers must balance contractual rights, operational
resilience, value for money and the procurement rules that govern any response.
During the
pandemic, the Cabinet Office issued Procurement Policy Note (PPN) 02/20 in
March 2020, encouraging contracting authorities to support suppliers at risk.
Measures included accelerated and advance payments and continued payment during
interruption, subject to open-book information. PPN 04/20 subsequently provided
guidance on continuing appropriate supplier support and preparing transition
plans between 1 July and 31 October 2020. Both notes sought to preserve
essential services and supply chains, without creating any automatic contractual
entitlement to force majeure relief.
That
experience continues to shape practice under a new statutory regime. Many
public contracts now require suppliers to maintain and test business continuity
plans, notify disruption early and share recovery information. Public bodies
should equally recognise that relief granted informally, without a contractual
basis, can create audit concerns and unhelpful precedent. Decisions should rest
on documented contractual analysis, a clear value-for-money rationale and
compliance with the applicable modification and transparency rules.
The Procurement Act 2023 –
Modifying Contracts After Disruption
For
contracts governed by the Procurement Act 2023, section 74 and Schedule 8
define when a public contract may be modified. Contractual relief for force
majeure does not, by itself, authorise an otherwise impermissible change. Where
disruption requires an actual modification of contractual rights, including
revised payments, scope or delivery obligations, the change must comply with
section 74. Applying an existing force majeure provision according to its
agreed terms does not necessarily constitute a new modification, although any
separately negotiated change must be assessed against the applicable statutory
requirements.
Section 74
also permits modifications that are not substantial or qualify as
below-threshold modifications, subject to the statutory conditions. Light touch
contracts are addressed separately. Consequently, not every lawful contract
modification needs to rely upon a specific permitted ground in Schedule 8. Schedule
8, paragraph 4, permits changes arising from circumstances the contracting
authority could not reasonably have foreseen before award, provided the
modification does not change the contract’s overall nature.
It must
not increase the estimated contract value by more than 50%, although that
financial limit does not apply to utilities contracts. Genuinely unexpected
disruption may therefore support a proportionate change, but foreseeable supply
chain weaknesses are unlikely to qualify under this ground. Paragraph 5 adds a
new ground where a known risk materialises without either party’s fault. A
known risk is one the authority considered could jeopardise satisfactory
performance but could not be addressed in the contract as awarded, and was
identified, with the possibility of modification, in the tender or transparency
notice.
The change
must go no further than necessary, a new award must not be in the public
interest, and the 50% limit applies except where the contract being modified is
a utilities contract. When deciding whether a new contract would be in the
public interest, the contracting authority must consider whether a replacement
procurement could provide better value for money. It may also take relevant
technical and operational considerations into account.
Transparency
duties operate separately. Under section 75, a contract change notice must
generally be published before a modification, subject to exemptions, including
certain smaller changes within limits on value (10%, or 15% for works) and term
(10%), and exclusions for defence and security, light touch and private utility
contracts. Where a contract change notice is required and the modified contract
exceeds £5 million, section 77 generally requires publication of the modified
contract or the modification within 90 days, subject to the statutory
exceptions applying to certain devolved Welsh authorities and procurement
arrangements.
Transitional
and territorial rules also matter. The Act generally governs procurements
commenced from 24 February 2025, while earlier procurements and resulting
contracts usually remain under the Public Contracts Regulations 2015, where
regulation 72 contains comparable modification grounds. The Act is not a single
regime for every UK public contract: Scottish devolved authorities follow
Scotland’s own legislation, and there are Welsh and Northern Irish variations.
Authorities should confirm the applicable regime before agreeing any change.
UK Contract Law and
Judicial Decisions – How Courts Interpret Disruption
Across the
authorities, English courts consistently emphasise contractual wording,
causation and the allocation of commercial risk. They are reluctant to rescue
parties from bargains that have simply become burdensome, and equally unwilling
to deny relief where a clause has been properly satisfied. The leading
decisions span almost seventy years, from post-war housebuilding to modern
sanctions, yet the underlying reasoning has remained remarkably stable for
those drafting and managing contracts today.
In Davis
Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council [1956] UKHL 3, contractors
agreed to build 78 houses for £85,836 within eight months. Labour shortages
extended completion to twenty-two months, but the House of Lords rejected a
finding of frustration. Unexpected difficulty and additional expenditure had
not transformed the agreed obligations into something radically different. The
case remains the starting point whenever a supplier argues that changed
circumstances should release it from a fixed-price commitment.
Commercial
hardship received similar treatment in Tandrin Aviation Holdings Ltd v Aero Toy
Store LLC [2010] EWHC 40 (Comm). The dispute concerned the sale of a Bombardier
executive aircraft for US$31.75 million, with a US$3 million deposit. The
purchaser attempted to invoke force majeure following the global financial
crisis. The High Court rejected that argument, noting that no English court had
treated a change in economic or market circumstances as force majeure.
Insurance
wording can matter as much as force majeure wording. In Financial Conduct
Authority v Arch Insurance (UK) Ltd [2021] UKSC 1, the Supreme Court ruled
largely in favour of policyholders on business interruption cover for COVID-19
closures. The case potentially affected approximately 370,000 policyholders
across 700 policy types issued by around 60 insurers. Preliminary FCA
information identified approximately 8,500 relevant claims, with an estimated
aggregate value of £1.2 billion under stated assumptions. That figure was not
an amount awarded by the Supreme Court.
More
recently, commercial authorities have refined the approach. Seadrill confirms
that a listed event will not assist where another uncovered cause also operated
and reasonable endeavours were not used. Classic Maritime shows that some
clauses require proof that performance would otherwise have occurred. MUR
Shipping establishes that reasonable endeavours do not, without clear wording,
oblige a party to accept performance other than what it contracted for.
Together,
these decisions offer practitioners a consistent framework. First, identify
exactly what the clause covers and requires. Second, establish whether the
event actually caused the failure, and whether any uncovered cause contributed.
Third, examine what reasonable steps were available within the contract as
written. Finally, consider whether frustration, insurance or statutory
adjustment offers a separate route. Judicial protection consistently follows
the agreement rather than the scale of the crisis.
Drafting Effective Force
Majeure Clauses – Preventing Disputes Before They Arise
Effective
provisions begin with definitions that reflect the contract’s operational
risks. Clauses should identify qualifying events, such as extreme weather,
government restrictions, war, industrial action and infrastructure failure,
while stating whether cyber attacks, epidemics and subcontractor disruption are
included. Express exclusions for price increases, lack of funds and foreseeable
operational problems are equally important. Carefully selected wording provides
far greater certainty than an unrestricted list of exceptional circumstances.
The
required connection between event and failure should be stated clearly.
Expressions such as ‘prevented’, ‘hindered’ and ‘delayed’ establish different
thresholds, and drafters should state whether the event must be the sole cause
and whether the affected party must show it would otherwise have performed.
Reasonable endeavours provisions should specify whether alternative sourcing, revised
transport or partial fulfilment are expected, together with any limits on
additional expenditure or non-contractual performance.
Notification
and evidence requirements deserve equally careful drafting. A clause should set
out when notice must be given, who must receive it and what supporting
documentation is required, and should state expressly whether timely notice is
a condition precedent to relief. Requiring regular updates throughout prolonged
disruption helps customers activate contingency arrangements and discourages
unsupported claims raised only after delivery deadlines have already passed,
when evidence is weaker.
Financial
consequences need particular attention in substantial agreements. An
illustrative £5 million contract might provide extensions without additional
payment, permit recovery of specified costs or suspend charges for interrupted
services. The clause should address accrued liabilities, deposits, ongoing
payments and damages, and define termination thresholds, notice periods and
responsibilities for outstanding work or materials. Aligning these provisions
with insurance cover and continuity obligations avoids gaps that neither party
has priced.
Supplier-friendly
provisions may allow broader qualifying events and longer recovery periods,
whereas customer-friendly clauses may require stronger evidence, earlier
notification and more demanding mitigation. Neither approach automatically
produces better outcomes. Excessively restrictive clauses can threaten supplier
viability, while unrestricted relief transfers disproportionate risk to
customers. Balanced drafting should reflect service criticality, supply chain
resilience, insurance arrangements and each party’s realistic ability to
control or recover from disruption.
Managing Supplier Claims –
A Practical Procurement and Contract Management Approach
Effective
claims management begins when a supplier reports circumstances affecting
performance. The customer should acknowledge the notification, identify the
relevant agreement and review the precise force majeure provisions before
taking a substantive position. Contract managers must establish which
obligations are affected, whether the event qualifies and whether notice
requirements have been met. Initial acknowledgement should be worded so that it
does not inadvertently accept entitlement or waive contractual rights.
Supporting
documentation should establish the event, its duration and its connection to
the failed performance. Appropriate evidence may include official restrictions,
production schedules, transport records, photographs, subcontractor
correspondence, security incident reports and contemporaneous operational logs.
The customer should also check whether difficulties existed before the alleged
event. Where evidence is incomplete, proportionate requests for clarification
are preferable to unsupported assumptions, especially where significant
liabilities or essential public services are involved.
Mitigation
plans should be assessed alongside immediate operational needs. A hospital
awaiting critical equipment, or a housing provider facing a stalled repairs
programme, may need alternative suppliers, temporary substitutes or revised
priorities before any legal dispute is resolved. Contract managers should weigh
service continuity, inventory, quality requirements and the cost of emergency
purchasing, while ensuring replacement arrangements respect existing
commitments, procurement legislation and delegated financial authority.
Formal
decisions should record the contractual interpretation, evidence considered,
mitigation assessment and reasons for accepting, partially accepting or
rejecting relief. Where disagreement persists, escalation, negotiation,
mediation or the contract’s dispute resolution procedure may provide an
appropriate route. Premature acceptance can surrender valuable protections,
while unjustified rejection may create additional liabilities and damage
relationships. Documented, proportionate decisions preserve accountability
without allowing legal disagreement to overwhelm operational continuity.
Summary – Exceptional
Circumstances Do Not Automatically Remove Contractual Obligations
Force
majeure provides valuable protection when exceptional circumstances genuinely
interfere with performance, but it does not automatically excuse commercial
commitments. English law requires parties to establish entitlement through the
provisions they actually agreed to. Natural disasters, pandemics, conflict,
cyber attacks, and government restrictions may qualify, but the mere existence
of such events is never sufficient on its own. Contractual wording, causation
and the real consequences for performance remain central to every assessment.
The line
between unavoidable disruption and ordinary business risk is particularly
important. Rising costs, reduced margins, labour shortages and subcontractor
difficulties do not automatically justify suspension or termination, as the
construction materials surge of 2021 and the energy shocks that followed
demonstrated. Suppliers must show how qualifying circumstances affected their
obligations and whether reasonable alternatives existed, while preventable
failures, including known and unresolved defects, may undermine protection
entirely.
The courts
have applied these principles consistently. Davis Contractors and Tandrin
Aviation show that hardship is rarely enough, Seadrill and Classic Maritime
demonstrate the importance of causation, and MUR Shipping confirms that
reasonable endeavours operate within the contract as written. The Super Servant
Two adds that self-induced obstacles cannot frustrate a contract. Together,
these authorities explain why extraordinary events must be assessed against
enforceable obligations rather than commercial expectations.
For public
bodies, the Procurement Act 2023 adds a further layer. Where supplier relief
requires modifying the existing contract, the change must comply with the
applicable procurement legislation. The known-risk modification ground
additionally requires the risk and possibility of modification to have been
identified in the relevant tender or transparency notice before contract award.
Transparency duties then follow. For private sector buyers, recent cyber
incidents carry an equally clear lesson: insurance, continuity planning and
supply chain visibility often matter more than the force majeure clause itself.
Ultimately,
successful contract management requires a balanced understanding of legal
entitlement and commercial reality. Customers should not accept unsupported
claims, but neither should they dismiss genuine disruption without examining
the agreement and the evidence. Suppliers must recognise that contractual
protection carries responsibilities as well as rights. Clear risk allocation,
proportionate mitigation and transparent communication allow organisations to
navigate exceptional events without sacrificing certainty, essential services
or long-term relationships.
Additional
articles can be found at Business Law Made Easy. This site looks at business
legislation to assist organisations and people in increasing the quality,
efficiency, and effectiveness of their product and service supply to the
customers' delight. ©️ Business Law Made Easy. All rights reserved.
Further Reading –
Legislation, Judicial Decisions and Official Sources
Legislation
- Procurement Act 2023: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2023/54/contents
- Procurement Act 2023, section 74 (modifying public contracts): https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2023/54/section/74
- Procurement Act 2023, section 75 (contract change notices): https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2023/54/section/75
- Procurement Act 2023, section 77 (publication of modifications): https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2023/54/section/77
- Procurement Act 2023, Schedule 8 (permitted contract modifications): https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2023/54/schedule/8
- Public Contracts Regulations 2015, regulation 72 (legacy contracts): https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2015/102/regulation/72
- Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo6/6-7/40/contents
- Frustrated Contracts Act (Northern Ireland) 1947: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/apni/1947/2/contents
- Sale of Goods Act 1979, section 7 (goods perishing after agreement to sell): https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1979/54/section/7
- Procurement Reform (Scotland) Act 2014: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2014/12/contents
- Public Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 2015: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ssi/2015/446/contents
Judicial Decisions
- RTI Ltd v MUR Shipping BV [2024] UKSC 18: https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/uksc/2024/18
- Financial Conduct Authority v Arch Insurance (UK) Ltd [2021] UKSC 1: https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/uksc/2021/1
- Bank of New York Mellon (International) Ltd v Cine-UK Ltd [2022] EWCA Civ 1021: https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewca/civ/2022/1021
- Classic Maritime Inc v Limbungan Makmur Sdn Bhd [2019] EWCA Civ 1102: https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewca/civ/2019/1102
- Canary Wharf (BP4) T1 Ltd v European Medicines Agency [2019] EWHC 335 (Ch): https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewhc/ch/2019/335
- Seadrill Ghana Operations Ltd v Tullow Ghana Ltd [2018] EWHC 1640 (Comm): https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewhc/comm/2018/1640
- Tandrin Aviation Holdings Ltd v Aero Toy Store LLC [2010] EWHC 40 (Comm): https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewhc/comm/2010/40
- Thames Valley Power Ltd v Total Gas & Power Ltd [2005] EWHC 2208 (Comm): https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewhc/comm/2005/2208
- Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council [1956] UKHL 3: https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1956/3.html
Official Guidance, Reports
and Statistics
- Cabinet Office – Permitted contract modifications and the materialisation of a known risk: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/procurement-act-2023-short-guides/the-procurement-act-2023-permitted-contract-modifications-and-the-materialisation-of-a-known-risk-html
- Procurement Policy Note 02/20: supplier relief due to COVID-19: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/procurement-policy-note-0220-supplier-relief-due-to-covid-19
- Procurement Policy Note 04/20: recovery and transition from COVID-19: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/procurement-policy-note-0420-recovery-and-transition-from-covid-19
- NAO – Investigation into government procurement during the COVID-19 pandemic: https://www.nao.org.uk/reports/government-procurement-during-the-covid-19-pandemic/
- NAO – The supply of personal protective equipment during the COVID-19 pandemic: https://www.nao.org.uk/reports/supplying-the-nhs-and-adult-social-care-sector-with-personal-protective-equipment-ppe/
- NAO – Investigation into the management of PPE contracts: https://www.nao.org.uk/reports/investigation-into-the-management-of-ppe-contracts/
- Environment Agency – Flood and coastal erosion risk management report, 2023 to 2024: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/flood-and-coastal-risk-management-national-report/flood-and-coastal-erosion-risk-management-report-1-april-2023-to-31-march-2024
- Met Office – UK Storm Centre: https://weather.metoffice.gov.uk/warnings-and-advice/uk-storm-centre
- Cyber security breaches survey 2025: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/cyber-security-breaches-survey-2025
- Office for National Statistics – Producer price inflation bulletins: https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/bulletins/producerpriceinflation/previousReleases
- Building materials and components: monthly statistics: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/building-materials-and-components-monthly-statistics-2012
- National Energy System Operator – Final report of the review into the North Hyde substation outage: https://www.neso.energy/national-energy-system-operator-publishes-final-report-review-north-hyde-substation-outage
- Government backs Jaguar Land Rover with £1.5 billion loan guarantee: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-backs-jaguar-land-rover-with-15-billion-loan-guarantee
- J Lauritzen AS v Wijsmuller BV (The Super Servant Two) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1; [1989] EWCA Civ 6 – Court of Appeal judgment: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1989/6.html